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ELEVATOR PITCH: The UK labor market experience in the Great Recession is consistent with the view that the UK labor 
market is relatively flexible. Unemployment rose less and recovered faster than in most other European economies. An 
open question is whether the stagnation of productivity and wages, which is the flipside of this success story, represents 
a cyclical phenomenon or a structural problem. The planned exit of the UK from the European Union, possibly the greatest 
current threat to the UK labor market, is not yet visible in labor market statistics. 
1 The opinions expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the European Commission. 
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PROS CONS 
Unemployment returned to below its pre-2008 recession 
level. The UK market suffered less and recovered better 
from the Great Recession than most other EU countries.  
The flipside of the low levels of unemployment and high 
levels of employment is stagnating labor productivity. 
After the 2008 recession, labor productivity growth never 
recovered to its pre-recession growth rate.  
While wage inequality was increasing until about the year 
2000, it has been decreasing over the last 10 years.  
Real mean/median weekly and hourly earnings remain 
below their pre-recession levels.. 
While both non-EU and EU immigrants had higher 
unemployment rates than UK-born workers before the 
Great Recession, both groups of immigrants have fared 
relatively better since 2008.   
The exit of the UK from the European Union , is likely to 
have large effects on the UK labor market.  
The female-male median hourly earnings ratio has been 
narrowing and is 90% as of 2016. 
AUTHORS’ MAIN MESSAGE: 
The UK labor market weathered the Great Recession well, at least compared to other European countries. 
Unemployment rose by about 3% points, started declining relatively soon after, and is now back at the pre-recession 
level of around 5%. The female wage gap and earnings inequality have been decreasing for the past 10 years. The gap 
between the unemployment rates of foreign-born and UK-born workers narrowed after the Great Recession and 
completely disappeared for European immigrants. The flipside of this success story is a stagnation of labor productivity 
and earnings. While output per hour worked was steadily growing at about 2% annually before 2008, the crisis led a 
seemingly permanent slowdown in productivity growth. Output per hour remains at a low level compared to other 
OECD countries. 
Motivation 
The UK's labor market is an important case to study since, while part of the European Union, it has long been considered 
the most ‘American’ of European labor markets.  UK workers enjoy by far the least employment protection in Europe.  
Even internationally, only few countries such as the US, Canada, and New Zealand offer workers less protection.2
Another distinct feature is that, potentially due to language and other cultural factor, the UK has for a long time been an 
attractive destination for both low- and high-skilled migration.  
Discussion of pros and cons 
Aggregate Unemployment 
The Graphical Abstract shows the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate from 2000 to 2016. As indicated by the gray 
shading, the Great Recession in the UK started in the second quarter of 2008 and lasted five quarters. The unemployment 
rate rose from 5.4% to 7.8% in the second quarter of 2009. After that, the unemployment rate stayed elevated at slightly 
below 8%, but began falling in 2011. The reduction in unemployment accelerated in late 2013, and as of the 4th quarter of 
2016, UK unemployment was back at pre-recession level of 4.8%. 
The Graphical Abstract also shows the redundancy rate (number of redundancies per 1,000 employees) and the job 
vacancies ratio (vacancies per 100 employee jobs), which are reported by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) since the 
2nd quarter of 2001. The redundancy rate was continuously falling until the 2nd quarter of 2008, increased sharply during 
the recession but then returned to its pre-recession level quickly. Vacancies, on the other hand, remained suppressed for 
several years after the official end of the recession and only increased to their pre-recession level towards the end of 2014. 
2 http://www.oecd.org/els/emp/oecdindicatorsofemploymentprotection.htm
That is, while increase in the unemployment rate during the recession was a consequence of both increased redundancies 
(inflows into the unemployment pool) and less hiring (decreased outflows), the sustained high levels of unemployment 
after 2009 seem to be mostly due to the difficulty of unemployed workers in finding new jobs. 
While the UK labor market was substantially affected by the recession in 2008, it fared rather well compared to other 
European labor markets. (The unemployment rate for the EA18 (the 18 nations in the euro zone as of 1 January 2014) is 
also shown in the Abstract.) While unemployment in the EA18 was consistently about 3 percentage points higher 
compared to the UK, there were some signs of convergence before the 2008 recession. Compared to the UK labor market, 
the 2008 recession affected the EA18 unemployment rate much more profoundly than UK unemployment. The 
unemployment rate in the EA18 stayed elevated for years after the financial crisis in 2008 and remains so at the end of 
2016. 
Figure 1: Unemployed for more than 12 and 24 months in the UK and EU18  (as share of total unemployment) 
Sources: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat (series une_ltu_q) and https://www.ons.gov.uk (series MGSX)
Long Term Unemployment 
An important concern for both economists and policy makers is the development of long-term unemployment [1]. While 
short term unemployment is a necessary side-effect of the reallocation of talent within the labor market, high numbers 
of long-term unemployed may point toward structural problems in labor market institutions and thus may indicate the 
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need for reform. Long-term unemployment also has important social consequences because a disproportional share of 
the burden of a recession is concentrated on relatively few individuals. It is a major cause of poverty and affects people's 
mental and physical health. Furthermore, the long-term detachment of workers from the labor market may lead their 
human capital to depreciate, since this makes it even harder for them to find a job in the future, spurring a vicious cycle 
and potentially increasing the ‘structural’ rate of unemployment. 
Figure 1 shows the long (more than 12 months) and very-long term unemployed (more than 24 months) as a share of total 
unemployment. In the 2008 recession, long-term unemployment fell as a percentage of total unemployment, only to rise 
substantially during the recovery. This is consistent with the increase in the overall unemployment rate being driven 
primarily by increased redundancies, whereas the persistently high unemployment during the recovery was mostly due 
to low finding rates (compare to the Graphical Abstract). 
During the recovery, almost 40% of unemployed workers in the UK had been unemployed for at least a year. While striking, 
this number is relatively small compared to other European countries. The share of long and very-long term 
unemployment in the EA18 was about 20 percentage points higher than in the UK. In addition, while the share of long 
term unemployment in the UK started falling again in 2013 and is now back at pre-recession levels, the effect of the 2008 
recession on long-term unemployment in the EA18 is still visible today. 
Figure 21:  Youth unemployment (as share of total unemployment) 
Sources: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat (series une_rt_q)
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Unemployment among young workers is particularly worrying, since it may predict elevated unemployment rates in the 
future. Moreover, since the young unemployed neither attend school nor gather labor market experience, it may be an 
indicator of depressed future earnings as well. 
Figure 2 shows the unemployed aged 15 to 24 as a share of total unemployment. Youth unemployment contributed 
substantially to the overall increase in unemployment during the Great Recession: the share of youth unemployment went 
up from about 12% to 20%. Youth unemployment stayed elevated for several years after the recession was over, but has 
recently returned to pre-recession levels. Again, the UK compares favorably to the rest of Europe in this respect. 
Unemployment among Immigrants 
Figure 3: Unemployment rate by country of birth 
Sources: https://www.ons.gov.uk (data set A12)
Foreign-born workers are more likely to be unemployed than native workers. Before the Great Recession of 2008 the 
unemployment rate of immigrants was about 2 percentage points higher than of the UK-born population. The Great 
Recession affected foreign-born workers less than UK-born workers, and immigrants continued to catch up in the 
subsequent recovery. By 2016, the difference in the unemployment rate between the two groups was reduced to 0.7 
percentage points [2].  
Figure 3 further decomposes the unemployment rate of foreign-born workers into workers born in the EU27, that is, the 
EU Member States excluding the UK, and that of workers born outside of the EU. European workers had a slightly higher 
unemployment rate than UK-born workers before 2008. However, since they were much less affected by the Great 
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Recession, unemployment among EU27-born workers has been slightly lower than that of UK-born workers since then, 
ending up at just below 4% in the 4th quarter of 2016. 
Labor Force Participation 
There have not been many changes in labor force participation in the UK. As in most developed economies, and as Figure 
4 shows, there has been an increase in participation of women, in particular of 50-64 year olds. Contrary to the US labor 
market, inactivity (one minus the labor force participation rate).only slightly increased after the Great Recession.  
Figure 4: Inactivity 
Sources: https://www.ons.gov.uk (series LF2S, YBTM, LF2T, LWFK, LF2X) 
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Figure 5: Mean and median weekly and hourly pay
Sources: https://www.ons.gov.uk (data set "ASHE 1997 to 2016 selected estimates") and http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat (series 
LZVB)
Productivity and Wages 
Figure 5 shows labor productivity measured as output per hour worked (relative to its 2013 level), along with mean and 
median weekly and hourly pay. Output per hour was growing steadily at almost 2% per year until it fell sharply in the 2008 
recession. Since then, productivity growth has remained permanently below its pre-recession level, and output per hour 
only recently reached its pre-2008 level. This permanent low post-recession productivity growth trend has attracted a lot 
of attention.  It is at odds with the recovery of productivity following previous recessions in the UK, and is often referred 
to as the 'productivity puzzle [3]. In 2016, GDP per hour worked in the UK is 11% lower than in the EA18 and 20% below 
that of Germany, leading Chancellor of the Exchequer Philip Hammond to complain that it “takes UK workers five days to 
produce what Germans make in four”. 
The disappointing evolution of productivity is reflected in wages. Mean wages in Figure 5 are higher than median wages, 
indicating a right-skewed pay distribution, but the cyclical pattern of all series for earnings is relatively similar. According 
to all four measures, there has been a very substantial reduction in real pay since the 2008 recession. Although wages did 
not respond much initially when the recession hit, until very recently they have fallen continuously. Pay is still well below 
pre-recession levels as of 2016. There is also some indication that the 2008 recession led to a reduction in hours worked, 
as weekly pay is lagging even more than hourly pay. 
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Earnings Inequality 
A two-decade long rapid increase in earnings inequality in the UK came to a halt around 2000 and may have started to 
reverse in recent years. Figure 6 shows different measure of earnings inequality based on gross weekly earnings for full-
time employees. The 90th percentile of weekly earnings is slightly less than double median pay, and this ratio has stayed 
roughly constant since 2000. The median is around 1.8 times the 10th percentile, and this ratio has declined somewhat, 
with growth in low wages outstripping wage growth for high earners. As a consequence, the 90-to-10 percentile pay ratio 
has decreased over the sample, especially in the last few years [4]. 
Finally, Figure 6 shows the evolution of inequality at the very top of the earnings distribution. There is a concern, 
particularly in the US, that earnings growth of the ‘lucky few’ is vastly outpacing that of other workers.. As can be seen in 
the figure, this is not the case in the UK. The 99-to-90 percentile pay ratio in fact decreased slightly from about 2.2 to 2.1 
over these 16 years. 
Figure 6: Earnings inequality 
Sources: https://www.ons.gov.uk (data sets "ASHE 1997 to 2016 selected estimates" and "ASHE UK, Public and Private 90th - 99th 
Percentile data")
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Since the Equal Pay Act 1970, it has been illegal in the UK to reward women and men differently for the same work. 
Nevertheless, the gender wage gap has been slow to close. The good news is that, half a century later, we seem to be 
getting there. 
Figure 7 shows median female pay as a share of median male earnings. When considering all employees, women still earn 
much less than men, although the difference is slowly disappearing, from about 57% in 2000 to slightly over 65% in 2016. 
Interestingly, the recession seems to have sped up the shrinking of the gender wage gap somewhat, indicating that men 
were relatively more badly affected by the 2008 recession than women [5]. 
A large part of that difference in pay is due to women working fewer hours. When considering only full-time employees, 
the ratio of female to male pay in 2016 is 83%. When further looking at hourly instead of weekly earnings, the ratio further 
increases to about 90%, so the remaining pay gap in 2016 is about 10%. In addition, a simple comparison of female and 
male (median) pay per hour does not take into account differences in pay due to composition effects, that is, the fact that 
women and men tend to be employed in different industries or occupations. Controlling for these factors is likely to further 
decrease female-male pay differences and the 10% gender wage gap should therefore be seen as an upper bound.  
Figure 72: Female-male pay differences 
Sources: https://www.ons.gov.uk (data set "ASHE 1997 to 2016 selected estimates")
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Limitations and Gaps 
First, there is a tendency towards an increasing share of the UK workforce being employed either part-time or with 
contracts that do not guarantee a minimum number of hours, so-called ‘zero-hours’ contracts. While such labor contracts 
make the labor market more flexible, they may negatively affect incentives to invest in workers' human capital, which may 
have contributed to the disappointing productivity growth. Second, there are substantial regional disparities on the UK 
labor market: unemployment rates, earnings, and labor productivity vary across regions, in particular between London 
and the rest of the UK. These disparities are quantitatively important, and there is no apparent tendency of a 'convergence' 
over the last 15 years.  
Finally, the event that is likely to have the biggest impact on the UK labor market since the Great Recession falls just 
outside of our sample period. On 23 June 2016, the UK voted to leave the European Union, and on 29 March 2017, Article 
50 of the Lisbon Treaty was triggered to start this process, so that the UK is due to leave the Union on 29 March 2019. A 
key component of leaving the EU is that the UK will be able to limit the rights of European immigrants to work in the UK. 
The effects of Brexit on the UK labor market are therefore likely to be substantial. European immigrants are strongly 
overrepresented in some occupations, so that limiting immigration is bound to increase labor market mismatch, at least 
in the short run. However, it will be at the end of the next decade at the earliest that this effect will be visible in the 
statistics. 
Summary and policy advice 
The UK labor market weathered the Great Recession well, at least compared to other European countries. Unemployment 
rose by about 3% points, started declining relatively soon after, and is now back at the pre-recession level of around 5%. 
Unlike in other very flexible labor markets such as the United States, earnings inequality has been decreasing for the past 
10 years. 
The flipside of this success story is a stagnation of earnings and a permanent slowdown in labor productivity growth after 
the Great Recession. The underlying causes of this productivity ‘puzzle’ are still unclear. Some argue that it is a direct 
consequence of the flexibility of the UK labor, since the availability of cheap labor implies that firms have relatively little 
incentive to invest in capital, resulting in a lower capital-labor ratio. Moreover, since in the flexible UK labor market 
workers have on average short tenure-on-the-job, incentives to invest in on-the-job training and job-specific human 
capital may be lower as well. 
If this explanation is correct, then concern about the productivity puzzle may be misplaced, since it is just the price to pay 
for the remarkable success of the labor market after the 2008 recession. It is not clear, however, why labor productivity 
recovered faster from previous recessions, when the labor market was similarly flexible. Some observers therefore argue 
instead that the post-crisis change in the productivity growth rate is directly related to an overly lax monetary policy, 
which allowed inefficient firms that would not normally be competitive to survive. An alternative, more positive 
interpretation is that the UK economy is going through structural changes that come with painful reallocations in the 
medium term but will imply high productivity growth in the longer run.  
Further Readings
Gregg, Paul and Jonathan Wadsworth, eds (2011) The Labour Market in Winter: The State of Working Britain, Oxford 
University Press 
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